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DETERMINING DEDUCTIONS DESERVES
DEDUCTIBILITY
MALCOLM L. MORRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
P aying tribute was the insult added to the injury of being con-
quered. The costs associated with meeting one's federal tax obli-
gation are a similar affront. Although not double taxation per se,
compliance costs constitute a surcharge on the tax obligation itself.
Recent tax "reform" or "simplification" and other measures' have
only compounded this unpleasantness by adding to the already bur-
densome tax-filing and record-keeping requirements.2 Consequently,
the costs attributable to complying with the tax law are escalating.
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law;
LL.M., Northwestern University, 1977; J.D., SUNY-Buffalo, 1972; B.S., Cornell University,
1969.
1. Within the last 12 years, taxpayers have been subjected to three major pieces of tax
legislation: the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172
(1982); the Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (1984); and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA '86), Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085
(1987). There have also been a number of other pieces of tax legislation, such as the Tax Reform
Act of 1984 (TRA '84), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1986); the Competitive Equity Bank-
ing Act of 1987 (COBRA), Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1989); and the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1991). In addition,
occasionally a provision of the Internal Revenue Code ('"the Code") is either added, amended,
or deleted by some other Congressional action. See, e.g., The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-485, § 702, 102 Stat. 2343 (1989) (adding I.R.C. § 62(c) to the Code). (Sections in
Title 26 of the United States Code will hereinafter be referred to as I.R.C. § x).
2. See, e.g., Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 723, 95
Stat. 324 (1982) (changing information return requirements); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil-
ity Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 301, 303, 96 Stat. 324 (1984) (amending rules
governing requirements for withholding on and reporting of interest and dividend income, and
Title III, subtitle B, Parts 1 and 2, containing 11 provisions effecting, expanding, and improving
income reporting); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 976, § 141 (add-
ing new I.R.C. §§ 6707, 6111, requiring tax shelter registration); § 145 (requiring additional
reporting with respect to interest payments received); and § 155 (requiring additional substantia-
tion for charitable contributions). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA '86), Pub. L. No. 99-514,
100 Stat. 2085 (1987), made significant substantive changes to the Code, necessitating numerous
concomitant compliance charges. The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988
(TAMRA), Pub. L. No. 100-647, §§ 1011(b)(1)(4), 1006(h)(3)(A), 1015(e)(l)(A), 4005(gX3), 102
Stat. 3342 (1989), affected filing requirements with respect to information returns required for
nondeductible IRA contributions, business purchase price allocations, reporting by brokers, and
reporting with respect to a variety of real estate transactions. Moreover, the Internal Revenue
Service continues to add to its already impressive list of forms, making filing more onerous even
where legislation has not changed. For example, see I.R.S. Form 8855, instituted in 1991, which
all taxpayers claiming a business use of their home must file.
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Perhaps some solace can be had when these compliance expenses
are deductible.' Then, at least, their impact is partially neutralized, as
the deduction reduces the overall tax liability. However, even this mi-
nor satisfaction has now been eliminated for many taxpayers. Though
still deductible, in most instances tax compliance expenses must pass
through a newly installed additional "accounting" in order to provide
any tax benefits. 4 A limited number of taxpayers can avoid this obsta-
cle by characterizing the charges as a different type of deductible ex-
pense,5 but if the cost is incurred to fulfill one's tax obligation, what
policy goals permit the deduction in some instances but not others?
Why should only selected individuals benefit from a deduction for an
expense common to all taxpayers?
The current tax structure produces unfair and uneven results.
Change is warranted in the treatment of compliance costs, although
whether it makes sense to treat all tax compliance costs similarly is
questionable. Analyzing the development of the present rules should
provide some insight into how to improve the situation.
II. HISTORICAL HIGHPoINTS
Originally, there was no direct authority allowing a deduction for
personal income tax compliance costs. 6 Early attempts to deduct such
charges were unsuccessful, 7 consistent with the general tenet that de-
duction sections existed by "legislative grace" and were to be con-
3. I.R.C. § 212(3) (1993) permits a deduction for expenses incurred in the determination of
tax liabilities. See infra notes 55-103 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of this
provision.
4. Tax compliance costs are usually classified as "miscellaneous itemized deductions" un-
der Section 67, and as such are not deductible in many situations. See infra notes 112-123 and
accompanying text; see also I.R.C. § 67(a)-(b)(2) (1993).
5. Taxpayers pursuing a trade or business or engaged in certain income-producing activi-
ties are allowed a deduction for tax compliance cost expenses related to the business or activity.
See the discussion of Code sections 162(a) and 212, infra notes 124-149 and accompanying text.
6. The Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756, 759 (1916) was the original
federal income tax legislation. Section 5(a) of that act declared all personal expenses nondeducti-
ble. The only deductions specifically allowed were those for business expenses, interest, taxes,
losses, expenses for transactions entered into for profit but not related to a trade or business,
worthless debts, depreciation arising out of use in business, and certain expenses dealing with oil
and gas wells. See id. § 5(b).
7. See, e.g., Appeal of Charles Henry Mattlage, 3 B.T.A. 242 (1925) (disallowed deduc-
tion for charge incurred in connection with preparation of individual income tax return); Her-
mann v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 899 (1930) (fee paid to resist a proposed income tax
deficiency not deductible because it was a personal expense; filing an income tax return did not
constitute carrying on a trade or business); Keeler v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A 467 (1931) (fees
for services in connection with taxpayer's personal income tax liability not deductible even
though income was received from taxpayer's trade or business).
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strued strictly.' An expense was not deductible unless specifically
designated as such. Indeed, from their inception the tax statutes have
provided that all expenses not specifically enumerated in the deduc-
tion sections are to be deemed personal payments and thus nondeduct-
ible .
Despite the absence of specific authority for the deduction, some
taxpayers sought relief by asserting that the tax compliance costs were
incurred in their businses and claimed them as trade or business ex-
penses. The courts were hospitable to this approach, 0 but only if the
expense could be related to the pursuit of a trade or business." The
benefit was extended to taxpayers who were able to argue successfully
that active involvement in their own personal investment activities
constituted a trade or business. 2 However, this investors' tax advan-
tage was relatively short-lived. In Higgins v. Commissioner,3 the
United States Supreme Court held that managing one's own invest-
ment activities, no matter how extensive, did not constitute the carry-
ing on of a trade or business. Thus, Higgins made all expenses related
to such activities personal and nondeductible, effectively blocking the
way for deducting tax compliance costs related to them.' 4
8. Notable declarations of the proposition that deductions are a matter of legislative grace
can be found in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934), superseded by statute
(see In re Luster, 134 B.R. 632 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1991), rev'd, 138 B.R. 875 (N.D. IIl. 1992));
Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 704 (1937); Van Vleck v.
Commissioner, 80 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 656 (1936); Gillette v. Com-
missioner, 76 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1935).
9. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 2a, 39 Stat. 756, 757 (1916); Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, § 524, 53 Stat. 1, 16 (1939).
10. See, e.g., Forgeus v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 291 (1927) (attorney's charge for prepar-
ing income tax return deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense where taxpayer
was engaged in a trade or business).
11. See Gillette, 29 B.T.A. at 564 (attorneys' fees to secure refund of state inheritance tax
not deductible because cost not connected to the taxpayer's trade or business); Bibbs v. Commis-
sioner, 34 B.T.A. 1028 (1936) (attorney's fee paid defending against deficiency assessment not
deductible; taxpayer can be in a trade or business and still have expenses that do not arise out of
that enterprise); see also Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928) (controlling rule at
that time concerning nexus between the expense and the trade or business needed to permit a
deduction).
12. See Roebling v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 82 (1938) (taxpayer's management of her
investments sufficiently "active" to constitute a trade or business; related tax compliance costs
deductible); O'Neal v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Ga. 1940) (attorneys' fees including
tax return preparation charge deductible because taxpayer's management conservation and es-
tate-enhancing activities constituted a trade or business). For instances where the activities were
considered merely passive, and thus not sufficient to constitute a trade or business, resulting in
no deduction for tax compliance cost expenses, see Kales v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1046
(1936), aff'd, 101 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1939) and Heilbroner v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1200
(1936), affd, 100 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1938).
13. 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941).
14. See also Campbell v. Walker, 208 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1953) (loss incurred in handling
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A. Early Attempts at Deducting Compliance Costs: The Operation
of Section 23(a)(2)
In response to Higgins,5 Congress enacted section 23(a)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code ("the Code"), 6 the predecessor of the present
sections 212(1) and (2).17 The section permitted individuals to take tax
deductions for expenses incurred in the production or collection of
income when the activity could not qualify as a trade or business, as
well as for costs relating to the management, conservation, or mainte-
nance of property used in such an activity. The section did not specifi-
cally address tax compliance costs, but the regulations promulgated
for it did. These regulations made tax compliance costs deductible if
they were attributable to recovering either interest or a tax that could
itself be included as income, or if they constituted tax expenses related
to property held for the production of income.' 8 The regulations also
made clear that except for the noted items, costs for tax return prepa-
ration, other tax recoveries, and resisting deficiencies were not deduct-
ible.' 9 Notwithstanding these, albeit limited, deduction opportunities,
for the most part the courts refused to allow deductions for income
tax compliance costs. 20
The situation took a dramatic turn when, in deciding Trust of
Bingham v. Commissioner,2' the Supreme Court nullified a substantial
portion of the regulations. The issue in Bingham was whether attor-
neys' fees incurred by a trust in contesting an assessed income tax de-
ficiency were deductible. 22 The Government argued that the charges
the trustees paid were not related to the production of income, and as
such they were not deductible under section 23(a)(2) 3.2 The Court re-
sponded that the Government was reading the section too narrowly. It
stated that the provision did not "restrict deductions to those litiga-
personal investments not deductible); Beck v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1950) (loss
suffered by taxpayers in sale of real estate not deductible).
15. See H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-76 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1942).
16. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 1, §23(a) (1939) (as amended by the Revenue Act of
1942, Pub. L. No. 753, §§ 121(a)(2), (3), 56 Stat. 798, ch. 619 (1943)).
17. I.R.C. §§ 212(1), (2) (1954).
18. Treas. Reg. § 29.23(a)-15 (prior to 1946 amendment).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Higgins v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1944); Stoddard v. Commis-
sioner, 141 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1943); Hord v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1944) (noted
that there might be instances where "attorneys' fees expended in income tax litigation" would be
deductible, but failed to provide any further guidance); Willmott v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 321
(1943).
21. 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 369.
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tion expenses which alone produce income." 24 Rather, the section was
intended to allow a deduction for litigation expenses directly con-
nected to, or the proximate result of, managing income-producing
property. 25 The Court criticized the Government's regulations for fail-
ing to give ample recognition to the part of the statute that authorized
deductions for the management and conservation of property held for
the production of income, stating that it conflicted with the "meaning
and purpose of section 23(a)(2), and so is unauthorized." 2 6
In response to Bingham, the Government revised its regulations by
issuing a blanket statement that expenses incurred in determining
one's income tax liability would be deductible. 27 The amended regula-
tions also permitted a deduction for any expense incurred in determin-
ing a property tax assessable on income-producing property. 28
Although the changes probably went beyond what Bingham would
have required,2 9 the Government did put a significant restriction on
the applicability of section 23(a)(2). Specifically, expenses incurred in
contesting a liability (including a tax liability) would not be deductible
merely because income-producing property might have to be sold in
order to satisfy the liability.30 The meaning of "managing or conserv-
ing" property did not include protecting income-producing property
from attachment for claims unrelated to the property itself. The regu-
lation used gift taxes illustratively, noting that costs incident to con-
testing such taxes would not be deductible, even though income-
producing property would have to be sold to satisfy the tax. 3'
The lower courts reacted quickly to Bingham, handing taxpayers a
number of victories.3 2 One of these, the Tax Court's decision in Bag-
ley v. Commissioner,33 is particularly noteworthy. In Bagley, the tax-
payer claimed deductions under section 23(a)(2) for attorneys' fees for
investment counseling and estate planning. The court had no diffi-
24. Id. at 376.
25. Id.
26. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. .365, 377 (1945).
27. T.D. 5513, 1946-1 C.B. 61.
28. Id. at 62.
29. See Michael B. Lang, The Scope of Deductions Under Section 212, 7 REv. TAX'N INII-
VIDuALS 291, 326 n. 165 (1983) (citing Samuel Brodsky & David McKibbin, Deduction of Non-
trade or Non-Business Expenses, 2 TAX. L. REv. 39, 50 (1946)).
30. Treas. Reg. § 29.23(a)-15 (as amended in 1946).
31. Id. The regulation did, however, allow a deduction for costs incurred that were alloca-
ble to the interest charged on tax deficiencies.
32. See, e.g., Lykes v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Fla. 1949), rev'd, 188 F.2d 964
(5th Cir. 1951); Sergievsky v. MeNamara, 135 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Kohnstamm v.
Pedrick, 66 F. Supp. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
33. 8T.C. 130(1947).
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culty concluding that the investment advice charges were deductible. 4
However, the estate planning fees created a more complex problem.
The court distinguished a $5,000 fee charged for analyzing and devel-
oping various plans affecting income-producing properties from a
$4,000 fee assessed for advising the taxpayer regarding releasing a
power of appointment and funding a trust for her daughter." The
court likened the former to investment counseling costs, stating that
the new plan "effected a substantial rearrangement and reinvestment
of [the taxpayer's] entire estate of income-producing properties. '3 6
Since investment counsel fees are deductible, so too then must "surro-
gate" investment counsel charges be deductible .7
However, the court disallowed the entire deduction claimed for the
$4,000 charge; it could not see how advice as to which assets should
be used to fund a trust could be directly related to the management,
conservation, or preservation of income-producing property, regard-
less of whether or not income-producing assets themselves were the
properties transferred." Similarly, although releasing a power of ap-
pointment might result in some future savings on estate taxes, the
court did not find a nexus between the expense and the conservation
of income-producing property sufficient to satisfy the Bingham test.3 9
Thus, the transfer of property in order to reduce income and concom-
itant taxes does not, in and of itself, constitute management, conser-
vation, or maintenance of income-producing property such as would
make the planning costs associated with the transfer deductible.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cobb v. Commissioner o
reached a similar result, holding that attorneys' fees incurred to de-
fend against a gift tax deficiency were not deductible. The court stated
that there was no statutory authority for allowing the deduction of
expenses incurred in relation to gift tax issues. 4' In Cobb, as in Bagley,
there was a voluntary transfer of income-producing property that was
not directly related to its management, conservation, or maintenance.
Though sympathetic to the taxpayer's position, the court determined
34. Id. at 134.
35. Id. at 135.
36. Id.
37. Id. Interestingly, the court noted in its findings of fact that part of the $5,000 was
charged for establishing a revocable trust and giving advice with respect to canceling old and
acquiring new life insurance. The opinion, however, is noticeably silent on how these activities
were "directly connected with the management and conversation of ... income-producing prop-
erties," the basic test for determining deductibility. Id. at 133.
38. Bagley v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 130, 135 (1947).
39. Id. at 136.
40. 173 F.2d 711 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 832 (1949).
41. Id. at 713.
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that the proximity between the expense and the statutory deduction
categories was insufficient to satisfy the Bingham test. 42 Further, the
court felt constrained by the treasury regulations, especially since the
regulations specifically denied deductibility for gift tax-related costs.4
The Supreme Court in Lykes v. United States4 supported in toto
both Cobb and the treasury regulations it relied upon. In Lykes, the
Court refused to allow a deduction for attorneys' fees incurred in con-
testing a gift tax deficiency, primarily because the costs were not prox-
imately related to the production of income. 4 The Court held that
"[lI]egal expenses do not become deductible merely because they are
paid[-]for services which relieve a taxpayer of liability.""6 Although
the fees were paid before the regulations were revised to specifically
deny deductibility of gift tax compliance costs, the Court nonetheless
cited with approval the regulations that had since been adopted. 47
Selig v. Allen" put an interesting spin on this issue. There, a widow
was faced with a potential estate tax liability on her share of income-
producing property that was improperly titled in her deceased hus-
band's name alone.4 9 In order to ensure that her rightful share of the
assets was not subjected to her deceased husband's estate tax account-
ing, the widow incurred attorneys' fees to have her share titled in her
name alone. 0 The court determined that the fees were deductible ex-
penses incurred to conserve income-producing property, since failure
to take the retitling action would have resulted in a loss of income-
producing property owned by the taxpayer. 5' The Government's chief
contention was that the costs were capital expenditures, not deductible
expenses, but the court had little difficulty putting that argument to
rest.12 Of particular interest is that the court focused on the facts that
gave rise to the retitling action, concluding it was "conservatory in its
nature," 5 3 thus rendering moot the point that taxes were the threaten-
ing risk.5 4
42. Id. at 714.
43. Id. at 715; Treas. Reg. § 29.23(a)-15 (as amended in 1946).
44. 343 U.S. 118 (1952), superseded by statute (see Accardo v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 444
(1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3598 (1992)).
45. 343 U.S. at 124.
46. Id. at 125.
47. Id. at 126.
48. 104 F. Supp. 390 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 200 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1952).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 392.
52. Id.
53. Allen v. Selig, 200 F.2d 487, 488 (5th Cir. 1952).
54. The circuit court noted that Lykes has never been read to preclude a section 23(a) de-
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B. Section 212(3): Congress' Answer to Inequitable Treatment of
Compliance Costs
Congress acted to remedy the disparate treatment accorded compli-
ance costs for different taxes with the introduction of section 212(3)
of the Code." The section simply allows individuals to take a deduc-
tion for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid.., in connec-
tion with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax."'56 The
regulations promulgated for section 212(3) seemed to favor a liberal
interpretation of the new provision.17 Expenses are deductible when
incurred for 1) tax counsel, 2) in connection with the preparation of
tax returns, or 3) in connection with any proceeding involved in deter-
mining the extent of or contesting a tax liability.
Despite its simplicity, the provision was not uncontroversial. The
first case to test the section's application resulted in a taxpayer vic-
tory. In Bonnyman v. United States, 8 the court allowed a deduction
for legal expenses incurred by a donee as a result of a gift tax defi-
ciency assessment. Looking to the "broad language" of the new sec-
tion, the treasury regulations, and the Senate Finance Committee
Report, the court concluded that the expenses at issue clearly were of
a type contemplated by the Code draftsmen.5 9
The next major test came in Davis v. United States,6 where the
Government would not allow a deduction for legal fees incurred for
tax advice incident to the negotiation of a marital separation agree-
ment. The Government argued that because there was no "contest"
of a tax liability in issue, a deduction was unwarranted .6 This time it
was the Court of Claims, relying on the treasury regulations, that had
no difficulty finding the fees deductible as tax-related charges. The
court required only that there be an accounting for the costs attributa-
duction merely because the expense incurred would result in relief from a tax liability, id. at 489,
and that Lykes was not applicable to these facts, because here the expense was incurred to have
mistitled property retitled, rather than to defend against a tax. See id. at 488-89.
55. Internal Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 212(3), 68A Stat. 69 (1954).
56. Id.
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1993).
58. 156 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Tenn. 1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d 835 (6th Cir. 1958).
59. The question of who was actually obligated to pay the deficiency, if any, was also an
issue in the case. Id. Donors were primarily liable for the gift tax. I.R.C. § 1009 (1939). Donees
were secondarily liable under "transferee liability" rules of I.R.C. § 1012 (1939). The court
viewed the latter principles as making the donee a proper party to the "contest". See 156 F.
Supp. 625 at 627-29.
60. 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
61. Id.
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ble to the tax planning, separate from the billing for other legal serv-
ices .62
Not deterred, the Government pressed its "necessity of a contest"
point in Kaufmann v. United States.63 There, the taxpayers incurred
accountants' fees for 1) securing a ruling from the I.R.S. on whether a
transaction would qualify for "tax free" treatment and 2) determining
the basis of the stock received in a reorganization. Relying on the
wording of its regulations, the Government argued that a deduction
was not warranted because the accountants' activities did not consti-
tute a "contest" of tax liability or a "determination of the extent of"
a tax liability." The Government buttressed its argument by citing the
legislative history of section 212(3), claiming that Congress' use of the
words "contest" and "contesting" was intended to preclude a deduc-
tion for "expenses incident to a determination of tax liability prior to
the period when it becomes contested." 6' In other words, notwith-
standing its setback in Davis, the Government again seemed to be
staking out the position that tax counsel fees, other than those related
to an existing tax controversy, were not deductible.
The court made short shrift of the Government's arguments relating
to the fees for obtaining the ruling. In the court's view, the ruling
helped determine the question of the parties' tax liability" and was
obtained solely for the purpose of "comput[ing] . . . the tax liability,
if any, which would arise from the exchange." 67 According to the
court, the expense clearly fell within the ambit of the section and was
deductible.6"
The court, however, sided with the Government regarding the fees
for determining basis. It concluded that there was no tax controversy
at issue to warrant a deduction.6 9 The court deemed the basis of the
stock to be informational only, and not sufficiently connected to the
determination of a tax.70
One must question what purpose basis serves, other than to com-
pute a tax. "Basis" is by definition a tax term, and although based on
62. Id. at 170-71. In Revenue Ruling 72-545, 1972-2 C.B. 179, the government liberally
identifies those situations in which legal fees incident to a divorce qualify as deductible tax coun-
sel fees.
63. 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963), appeal dismissed, 328 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1964).
64. Id. at 813 (emphasis omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 814.
67. Id. at 815.
68. Kaufmann v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 807, 815 (W.D. Mo. 1963), appeal dismissed,
328 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1964).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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cost, it is something quite different than a yardstick of one's actual
initial economic investment. 7' For example, the adjusted basis of
property used for computing gain or loss 72 can be affected by non-
investment events such as depreciation 73 and certain other business
transactions. 74 It is difficult to envision basis serving any purpose
other than assisting in planning for or determining a tax. Purchasers
of property will negotiate price based on fair market value, not basis.
Thus, the rationale used by the court leaves something to be desired.
Nonetheless, the Kaufmann result seems justifiable. Section 212(3)
could not be reasonably interpreted to permit deductions for costs
only remotely related to determining a tax; otherwise, any property
appraisal could become deductible on the theory that it was necessary
to assist the taxpayer in deciding what the tax consequences would be
should the property be donated to charity. 75 The appraisal cost of
property already contributed to charity is deductible,' 6 but to extend
the benefit to all appraisals on the theory that any asset could some
day be donated goes too far. The "remoteness" issue is one that war-
rants further analysis.
"A large piece of the "remoteness" puzzle concerns whether or not
an existing tax issue, as opposed to a potential future one, is being
addressed. Presumably, if the stock in Kaufmann had already been
sold, the cost of determining its basis would have been deductible.
The Government seemed to be pushing for an interpretation of section
212(3) that would limit the scope of deducting tax planning expenses
to those pertaining to the current tax year only. In the Government's
view, planning for future tax years did not fit into the definitions of
"contesting" or "determining" a tax. However, the Government also
lost in its attempt to limit section 212(3) to tax advice relating to the
year for which the deduction was claimed.
In Carpenter v. United States,77 the taxpayer sought to deduct tax
counsel fees incurred in structuring alimony payments incident to his
divorce proceeding. In a Davis7 -revisited opinion, the Court of
Claims affirmed its view that section 212(3) was not limited to tax
71. See I.R.C. § 1012 (1993).
72. Seeid. § 1011(a).
73. See id. § 1016.
74. See, e.g., id. § 301(c)(2) (requiring basis to be reduced by corporate distributions not
covered by earnings and profits); id. §§ 312, 316.
75. See generally id. § 170. For a full discussion of charitable deductions, see 8 MERTENS
LAW OF FEDERaL INcomE TAx §§ 31.01-31.141 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
76. Rev. Rul. 67-461, 1967-2 C.B. 125.
77. 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. CI. 1964).
78. Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 370
U.S. 65 (1962).
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counsel costs incurred incident to actual controversies. 79 It noted that
even though Davis had since been reviewed by the Supreme Court, 0
the tax counsel fee issue had not been addressed specifically. Addi-
tionally, the court observed that in United States v. Gilmore,"' the Su-
preme Court distinguished sections 212(2) and 212(3) of the Code
from one another, so that expenses not deductible under the former
nonetheless could be deductible under the latter.82 More importantly,
the court ruled that a section 212(3) deduction is not limited to ex-
penses incurred in a single year." Likening tax counsel fees to deduct-
ible investment counsel expenses, the court said that these costs are
often prospective in nature.14 Tax counsel may be obtained solely for
the purpose of avoiding future tax contests, and that alone should not
preclude its deductibility. 85 The court also suggested that limiting sec-
tion 212(3) to past years only "would defeat the clear purpose" of the
provision 6 and effectively would eviscerate the language in the regula-
tions that allows a deduction for expenses related to determining one's
tax liability. 7 In sum, the court was willing to give a much broader
interpretation to "determining" one's taxes than was the Govern-
ment.
After Kaufmann and Carpenter, the center of attention seemed to
shift from "contested tax liabilities" to "tax-related versus personal"
expense issues. The pivotal question was whether section 212(3) was
being used to convert personal, nondeductible expenditures into de-
ductible expenses. Estate planning fees were the primary culprits. Bag-
ley sanctioned a deduction for tax-related estate planning advice.
However, Bagley also clearly enunciated the principle that fees associ-
ated with the purely personal aspect of estate planning charges, such
as those incurred in establishing a trust, were not deductible ex-
penses."8
In Sidney Meriams v. Commissioner,9 the Tax Court met the issue
head-on, and a divided court confirmed the Bagley principles. The
Meriams court held that estate planning fees are deductible, but only
79. Carpenter, 338 F.2d at 368.
80. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), superseded by statute (see Laird v. United
States, 16 CI. Ct. 441 (1989)).
81. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
82. Id. at 48 n. 16.
83. Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366, 369 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 370.
87. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1993).
88. See Bagley v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 130 (1947).
89. 60 T.C. 187 (1973).
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to the extent they are attributable to tax planning. 90 Reasonable and
verifiable allocations of charges to these services became the operating
rule for determining their deductibility. Notably, the "current versus
future" tax determination issue did not go away. Some judges still
believed that section 212(3) should not be applied to prospective tax
liabilities .91
There has been little significant litigation recently concerning sec-
tion 212(3). The provision has been fairly well fleshed out, leaving a
vast array of tax-related expenses that qualify for the deduction. With
specific reference to federal income-tax related costs, the deductible
expenses range from actual tax return preparation, 92 including charges
for determining reportable items, 93 to prospective tax avoidance plan-
ning, 94 and the defense of criminal tax charges. 95 Given this broad
range of deductibility, section 212(3) was truly a taxpayer relief provi-
sion. Ironically, the push for tax reform and its putative call for low-
ering taxes has resulted in an elimination of the section 212(3) benefit
for all but a handful of taxpayers.
Because access to section 212(3) has been restricted, taxpayers are
actively pursuing other means of deducting tax compliance costs. Cer-
tain tax compliance costs are deductible under section 16296 or section
90. Id.
91. Id. at 190. Interestingly, some of the Meriams judges, in concurring opinions, expressed
the view that Code section 212(1) and (2), the successors to the provision used by the Bagley
court, might still be applicable to estate planning advice, despite the existence of section 212(3).
See id. at 190 (Scott, J., concurring); id. at 191 (Fay, J., concurring); id. at 192 (Sterrett, J.,
concurring). If the taxpayer could show that the expenses incurred met the statutory tests for
deductibility related to income-producing property, then section 212(2) could provide a tax bene-
fit. See id. at 191 (Fay, J., concurring); id. at 192 (Sterrett, J., concurring). However, something
more than just transferring income-producing property incident to an overall estate plan would
be required for either of these two subsections to apply. See Wong, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1073
(1989) (disallowing a deduction for legal fees incurred incident to the transfer of income-produc-
ing assets into a trust as part of an estate planning transaction).
92. See, e.g., Crowther v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1293 (1957), acq. 1964-2 C.B. 3; Dawk-
ins v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2667, 2670 (1991); Kozera v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1264, 1267 (1986); Rev. Rul. 89-68, 1989-1 C.B. 82 (fees paid to tax practitioner includ-
ing fees incurred in ruling request deductible subject to two percent floor).
93. See Rev. Rul. 67-461, 1967-2 C.B. 125 (appraisal fee to determine value of property
contributed to an organization); Rev. Rul. 58-180, 1958-1 C.B. 153 (appraisal fee to establish
casualty loss deductible).
94. See, e.g., Collins v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1656 (1970); Goldaper v. Commissioner, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 1381 (1977).
95. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-662, 1968-2 C.B. 69 (defense of criminal fraud indictment de-
ductible); Tranquilli v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 874 (1980).
96. I.R.C. § 162 (1993). In general, section 162 allows a deduction for all ordinary and
necessary business expenses. See generally 6 MERTENs LAW oF FEDERAL INcomm TAx, ch. 25
(1993).
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212(2). 97 Deductibility under section 212(2) sometimes offers benefits
not available for 212(3) items; deductibility under section 162 always
does. The availability of both deduction provisions for universally in-
curred expenses to some taxpayers, while others are limited to section
212(3), seems fundamentally unfair. The next section explores this
point.
III. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLICATIONS
Section 212(3) of the Code is broad in application and includes
costs well beyond those attributable to actually filling out and filing
tax forms. 9 Moreover, the deduction is not limited to costs related to
one's federal income tax. The section applies to expenses related to
many taxes, income or otherwise, 99 locall ° or national, foreign'01 or
domestic. Despite its apparent breadth, however, there is a significant
self-imposed limitation upon this Congressional munificence. The
benefit is conferred as a deduction, which provides a savings equal
only to a percentage of the actual cost incurred.
Initially, one might conclude that a federal subsidy based on one's
marginal tax rate is better than none at all, but it is important to view
section 212(3) from a broader perspective to determine whether the
benefit is truly fact or largely fiction. Closer inspection reveals that
the efficacy of section 212(3) is hampered by its interaction with other
tax provisions. The direct overriding control of section 6 7, 02 and the
indirect effects of section 62,103 severely limit the availability of section
212(3) to most individuals.
The following discussion briefly tracks the statutory scheme to help
explain the roles played by sections 62 and 67. Once deductibility un-
97. I.R.C. § 212(2) (1993). In general, section 212(2) permits a deduction for expenses paid
for the "management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of in-
come." See generally 6 MEaTENs LAW os FEDERAL INcoME TAx, ch. 25A (1993).
98. I.R.C. § 212(3) (1993).
99. See Northern Trust Co. v. Campbell, 211 F.2d 251 (7th Cit. 1954) (legal expenses in-
curred with respect to an estate tax liability deductible).
100. See Farnsworth v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1131 (1958) (fees for settling New York state
tax controversy deductible), aff'd, 270 F.2d 660 (1959); Reynolds v. United States, 338 F.2d I
(2d Cir.) (fees for contesting state tax assessment deductible), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977 (1965).
101. See Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (deduction permitted under
section 212(3) for legal expenses pursuant to resistance of Venezuelan property tax liability); see
also Rev. Rul. 62-9, 1962-1 C.B. 35.
102. Code section 67 limits and sometimes completely disallows deductions permitted by
other Code sections. I.R.C. § 67 (1993); see infra notes 112-123 and accompanying text.
103. Section 62 identifies certain deductions that are to be subtracted from gross income to
determine adjusted gross income. Other deductions are used to convert adjusted gross income
into taxable income. See infra note 106. Section 62 items are often referred to as "above the
line" deductions. All other deductions are "below the line". For a discussion of the impact of
this section on tax computation, see infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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der section 212(3) is established, it must then be determined "where"
the deduction is to be taken. More specifically, the inquiry is whether
the deduction is taken before or after adjusted gross income' °4 has
been computed. More often than not, this crucial determination will
govern whether any tax benefit for compliance costs will be allowed.
Section 62(a) lists deductions (the so-called "above-the-line deduc-
tions") that are used to convert gross income'05 into adjusted gross
income. All other deductions'0° are used to convert adjusted gross in-
come into taxable income.'0 7 By definition, all non-section 62 deduc-
tions are itemized deductions. 08 In computing taxable income, a
taxpayer has the option of reducing his or her adjusted gross income
by either the allowable itemized deductions or the statutory standard
deduction.? 9 (Taxpayers also are entitled to dependency deductions,
regardless of which path to taxable income is chosen). 110 Electing the
standard deduction precludes the use of itemized deductions, but does
not affect the availability of the section 62 deductions, which can al-
ways be taken to the extent of gross income."' Although the choice
between using the standard deduction or itemizing is a relatively easy
one, section 67 has made computing itemized deductions, and conse-
quently the "standard deduction versus itemization" decision, more
difficult.
Section 67 is high on the list of mischief-makers in the Code. It
converts otherwise deductible expenses into unfulfilled tax benefits. In
its simplest terms, the section separates itemized deductions into two
categories, miscellaneous and nonmiscellaneous." 2 Nonmiscellaneous
104. Adjusted gross income is gross income minus the deductions enumerated in I.R.C. §
62(a). See 1.R.C. § 62 (1993).
105. Section 61(a) defines the term "gross income," the starting point for all tax computa-
tions. Id. § 61(a).
106. Any deduction not identified in section 62 is an "other deduction". This includes the
standard deduction, see I.R.C. § 63 (1993), and the dependency deduction, see id. § 151.
107. Taxable income is the figure to which tax rates are applied. See id. § 1. The Code
provides alternative ways to compute taxable income-gross income minus all allowable deduc-
tions other than the standard deduction, or adjusted gross income minus the standard deduction
and personal exemptions. Id. § 63(a), (b).
108. Id. § 63(d).
109. Id. § 63(b).
110. See id. §§ 63, 151.
Ill. A taxpayer cannot have a negative taxable income for computational purposes. Once
taxable income is reduced to zero, the taxpayer will not have any income tax liability for that
year. Not all deductions in excess of the income for that year will necessarily be lost forever. See,
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 172, 1212(b) (1993) (unused losses may be carried back into past years and over
into future years).
112. Using the kind of tortuous wording often found in the Internal Revenue Code, section
67(b) classifies all itemized deductions except those specifically enumerated in the section itself as
"miscellaneous".
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itemized deductions are favored and always are deductible for taxpay-
ers who do not opt for the standard deduction. Section 67 does not
affect these items, though such deductions are subject to a different
limitation, the so-called "three percent rule.""'
The thrust of section 67 is directed to the newly created category of
miscellaneous itemized deductions. These expenses are deductible only
to the extent their aggregate exceeds two percent of adjusted gross in-
come." 4 As a result, a series of computations must be made to deter-
mine whether a miscellaneous itemized deduction may be taken in any
given year.
Determining the extent of the miscellaneous itemized deductions re-
quires a two-step computational process. First, all miscellaneous item-
ized deductions are aggregated. Second, the aggregate sum is
compared to two percent of adjusted gross income. The amount by
which the aggregate sum exceeds this two percent figure can be added
to the nonmiscellaneous items and deducted. The amount below the
two percent floor is neither currently deductible nor carried into other
tax periods; it is forever lost.'
The intended purpose and actual effect of section 67 was to elimi-
nate deductions as part of the base-broadening effort of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986.116 In theory, the broader base permitted lower tax
rates, while maintaining revenue neutrality. Although theoretically on
target, the classification of certain deductions as "miscellaneous"
may have been where Congress missed the mark.
An examination of the particular itemized deductions spared the
section 67 accounting fails to provide a clear pattern. However, some
general observations can be made. Some of the deductions seem to be
aimed at maintaining the integrity of taxing income as a "net" item," 7
113. Code section 68 reduces allowable itemized deductions for taxpayers making over
$100,000 per year by three percent of adjusted gross income in excess of $100,000, see I.R.C. §
68(b) (1993), but not to exceed 200o of the total amount of deductions claimed, see id. §
68(a)(2). Some deductions are exempt from the limitation, but tax compliance costs are not
among those. See id. § 68(c).
114. id. § 67(a).
115. Id.
116. See Joint Comm. on Tax'n, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R.
3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Part III, Title I, at 15 (1987).
117. Consider the "loss" deduction. Code section 67(b)(3) identifies only two subparagraphs
of section 165, the loss deduction section, as qualifying for nonmiscellaneous deduction treat-
ment. The first of these relates to personal casualty losses, and the second to gambling losses.
Looking at the latter first, the concept of taxing "net" income is clearly met. Section 165(d)
permits wagering losses only to the extent they offset wagering gains. The effect of the provision
is to tax only gambling gains (as opposed to all "winnings") and prevent gambling losses from
offsetting non-gambling income. Of course, the scheme does not guarantee the desired result.
Because section 165(d) is an itemized deduction, it will never be utilized if the taxpayer elects the
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whereas others appear to be sacred cows that were perhaps too dan-
gerous politically to alter. '
Expenses deductible under section 212 bear the brunt of section
67;"9 most other deductions are either protected by section 62, which
by definition makes them nonmiscellaneous deductions and thus be-
yond the reach of section 67,120 or by section 67 itself.' 2' Moreover,
even some of the section 212 expenses can escape section 67 treatment.
Section 212 items relating to the production of rents or royalties are
section 62 items as well, and therefore they never enter into the "item-
izing" calculus. 122 Essentially, what is left to the clutches of section 67
are those section 212 expenses 1) attributable to the business of being
an employee, 2) related to nonrecurring gains or portfolio income,
and 3) qualifying as tax compliance expenses. 123
The inherent unfairness in the current system comes into focus
when tax compliance costs are permitted to be characterized as some-
standard deduction. Thus, it is possible for total gambling winnings to be taxed without any
offset for gambling losses. This result, though perhaps unsatisfactory, was not caused by section
67. The loss of the deduction actually results from its exclusion from section 62.
The "net" income justification for subsection 165(c)(3) losses is somewhat more difficult to
see, but it exists nonetheless. At first blush, subsection (c)(3) casualty losses seem to be purely
personal loss items lacking any nexus to income. However, a closer look at subsection 165(h)
shows that these personal losses are deductible only to the extent their aggregate exceeds 10% of
adjusted gross income, and they are entirely deductible to the extent they offset gains from simi-
lar transactions. For example, the taxpayer who recovers insurance in excess of her adjusted
basis for property destroyed by fire will have realized a gain resulting from a casualty-type trans-
action. Unless otherwise protected, the gain will be recognized. Subsection 165(h)(1) considers
such possibilities and permits all losses from casualty transactions to offset similarly created
gains before applying the 10% floor. The justification for such a position is deference to the
"net" income concept.
118. A review of the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reveals that certain
code provisions were "untouchable". See supra note 1. Despite efforts to broaden the tax base
as extensively as possible, it became apparent that a number of deductions were not on the
negotiating table. Among these were the home mortgage interest deduction, I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)
(1993); the real estate and state income tax deduction, id. § 164(a); and the charitable deduction,
id. § 170. The medical expense deduction, id. § 213, was never seriously threatened, though the
floor was increased from five percent to seven and one-half percent of adjusted gross income,
which decreased the value of the deduction. The home mortgage deduction underwent some
change, but the limits on deductibility that were imposed, including a dollar amount (one million
dollars of indebtedness), and the number and type of properties that qualified, were of little
import to most taxpayers. The local tax deduction section lost some of its value when the state
sales tax deduction was eliminated, but efforts to do likewise to state income taxes failed. See
H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 137 (1986) (as passed by the Senate). Indeed, the other deduc-
tions in this second, protected category, probably also were viewed as either too embedded in the
system or too controversial to be repealed at that time.
119. Section 67 negatively impacts all of the section 212 expenses that are itemized deduc-
tions, not just the tax compliance costs of section 212(3).
120. See I.R.C. § 62 (1993).
121. See id. § 67(b) (classifying certain deductions as nonmiscellaneous itemized deductions).
122. See id. § 62(a)(4).
123. See generally id. §§ 67, 212.
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thing other than section 212(3) expenses. This is particularly true with
regard to costs incurred for executing and filing one's tax return. Such
expenses, potentially common to all taxpayers, become deductible for
some but not for others.
The questions of whether and when tax compliance costs can be
taken above the line are not new ones. Shortly after section 62 entered
the Code, ' 24 the correlative treasury regulations stressed that expenses
must be directly, not just remotely, related to the taxpayer's trade or
business to qualify for section 62 treatment. 125 Early tests of this inter-
pretation resulted in taxpayer victories.
First, in Standing v. Commissioner,26 the Tax Court ruled that fees
incurred in challenging a federal income tax deficiency relating to the
taxpayer's business income were trade or business expenses and were
therefore deductible "above the line". Then, in Wood v. Commis-
sioner,127 the Tax Court specifically held that section 212(3) did not
preempt other Code sections from allowing deductions for tax compli-
ance costs. The court stated that there was nothing to suggest that
Congress intended to make section 212(3) the exclusive provision for
deducting these types of expenses.' 2 It then held that the taxpayer
could deduct federal tax litigation expenses as ordinary and necessary
business expenses and did not have to rely on section 212(3) for the
deduction. 129 Thus, the deduction could be taken above the line.
The courts sought to implement the congressional intent "to make
as nearly equivalent as practicable the concept of adjusted gross in-
come, when that concept is applied' to different types of taxpayers de-
riving their income from varying sources."' 30 The relevant legislative
history stated that the deductions are limited to those that "fall within
the category of expenses directly incurred in the carrying on of a trade
or business. The connection contemplated by the statute is a direct
one rather than a remote one."3 However, the Senate Report specifi-
cally noted that state income taxes incurred on business profits are not
124. Section 62 was originally section 22(n) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code added by the
Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, § 8(a), Pub. L. No. 315, 78th Cong., 1944 C.B. 734, 738.
125. Rev. Rul. 45-5425, 1945 C.B. 10, 16.
126. 28 T.C. 789 (1957), acq., 1958-1 C.B., nonacq., 1958-1 C.B. 7, acq., 1958-2 C.B., non-
acq., 1958-2 C.B., nonacq. withdrawn, 1992-1 C.B., acq., 1992 C.B., aff'd, 259 F.2d 450 (4th
Cir. 1958).
127. 37 T.C. 70 (1961), acq., 1969-2 C.B. xxv.
128. id. at 75-76.
129. Id. at 76.
130. S. REp. No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1944), reprinted in 1944 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1056, 1079; H.R. REP. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1944).
131. S. REP. No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1944), reprinted in 1944 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1056, 1079; H.R. REP. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1944).
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deductible in computing adjusted gross income.'32 Thus, when con-
fronted with an attempted deduction for state income tax compliance
costs, the Tax Court in Tanner v. Commissioner3 3 denied section 62
treatment for the expenses, relying on the language of the legislative
history'34 and the regulations.13
Although federal income tax compliance costs related to challenging
deficiencies on business, rent, or royalty income had qualified as
"above-the-line" deductions, courts made little mention of actual re-
turn preparation expenses for these activities. Temporary
regulations 13 6 promulgated for section 67 of the Code determined that
return preparation expenses- are too remotely related to the business,
rent, or royalty activity to be considered section 62 items. 37 All tax
preparation fees, including those for preparing federal tax returns,
were deductible exclusively under section 212(3) and were therefore
required to undergo the section 67 accounting.
The Government amplified its position in a letter ruling, 3' where it
stated that tax advice and return preparation fees are not directly at-
tributable to the taxpayer's trade or business or his rent or royalty
activities. Such expenses were said to be incurred in connection with
the determination of a tax. 39 Even if some of the cost arose from
reporting trade or business activities or rent or royalty activities, de-
termining the tax is only remotely related to the activity itself. 40 Tax
preparation fees, even those incurred for filing schedules relating ex-
clusively to "trade or business" or "rent or royalty" activities, were
adjudged too remote from the actual carrying on of the favored activ-
ities themselves to justify section 62 tax treatment. 14 The letter ruling
analogized tax return preparation expenses to state taxes on net in-
come, the use of which has never been permitted when computing ad-
justed gross income.142
132. S. RP. No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1944), reprinted in 1944 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1056, 1079.
133. 45 T.C. 145 (1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1966).
134. Id. at 148 (citing Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499 (1961)).
135. Id. (citing Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1947); Helvering v.
Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938)).
136. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-IT-3T (1988).
137. Id. at § 1.67-IT(a)(1)(iii) (1988).
138. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-26-014 (June 28, 1991), reconsidered by Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-34-009
(August 21, 1992).
139. Id. at 8, 9.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
DEDUCTIBILITY
The Government subsequently performed an unexpected about
face. In Revenue Ruling 92-29,'14 it held that tax preparation expenses
and costs incurred in resolving asserted tax deficiencies properly allo-
cable to a taxpayer's trade or business as a sole proprietor would be
treated as section 62 items rather than as miscellaneous itemized de-
ductions. Accordingly, the portion of the taxpayer's tax preparation
fee attributable to preparing the tax schedule relating to the taxpayer's
trade or business (Schedule C) was held to be deductible in computing
adjusted gross income. The ruling relied on legislative history of the
adjusted gross income concept to justify this result. 14 The ruling es-
sentially likens the tax preparation fee for Schedule C to a routine cost
of doing business.145 As such the expense is directly connected to the
business activity. Therefore, it must be treated in the same manner as
other trade or business deductions, as failure to do so would under-
mine the purpose of section 62(a). The ruling goes on to hold that the
allocable portion of the tax preparation fee incurred in preparing tax
schedules for "rent or royalty" activities-whose expenses are deduct-
ible under sections 212(1) and (2) of the Code-also is deductible
when computing adjusted gross income. '4
Arguably, this ruling adds to the already complex maze of deduc-
tion interrelations. However, it limits the benefit of "above-the-line"
treatment to that portion of tax preparation fees incurred to comply
with reporting requirements for the section 62 activities. 147 Deductible
costs must be separated into section 62 activities and activities belong-
ing on the personal side of the ledger. The balance between nonper-
sonal deductible and personal nondeductible expenses ostensibly is
maintained, if not reinforced, but with an administrative cost. Now,
taxpayers, or more likely those who prepare their returns, will have
the opportunity to argue that the preparation of section 62 activity-
related schedules 148 is the most time consuming and costly part of the
entire return. Although this type of allocation issue is not novel,149 it
143. Rev. Rul. 92-29, 1992-1 C.B. 20.
144. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1944), reprinted in 1944
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1056).
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Private Letter Ruling 92-34-009 specifically identifies I.R.S. Form 1040, Schedules C
(reporting for an individual's trade or business), E (reporting rent and royalty activities), and F
(reporting farm income), as ones that will benefit from Revenue Ruling 92-29. According to one
author's observation, deducting tax preparation fees "above-the-line" has long been an accepted
practice. Phillip P. Storrer, Deducting Tax-Related Professional Fees, 51 TAx NoTEs 1575 n.3
(June 24, 1991).
149. See, e.g., Bagley v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 130 (1947) (court determined that only a
1993]
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undoubtedly will spawn additional audits as taxpayers strive for the
maximum deduction allowable. Perhaps Revenue Ruling 92-29 only
begs the larger question of whether certain tax compliance costs, such
as tax preparation fees, should be taken "above the line" universally,
and not only when linked to a section 62 activity.
A. Costs Considered
The interplay of section 67 of the Code and Revenue Ruling 92-29
provides favorable tax treatment to self-employed persons and taxpay-
ers who are involved in "rent and royalty" ventures. The question
that remains is: Is this result so bad that curative action is required?
There are certainly numerous other instances in the Code where some
taxpayers reap a benefit not available to others. These are based upon
a variety of factors which differentiate taxpayers from one another.5 0
But the issue in question is distinguishable in that the expense involved
not only is common to all taxpayers, but also originates from a Code
requirement that taxpayers file income tax returns.' 5' Furthermore,
Congress intended that section 67 limit the availability of certain de-
ductions, 1 2 including section 212(3) deductions. This limitation was
supposed to be carried out on a more or less even-handed basis. That
is, any taxpayer who overcame the two percent floor barrier qualified
for the tax benefit. Now, however, the balance has been upset through
the administrative, rather than legislative, process. What was origi-
nally designed as equal access for all has become a privileged avenue
portion of the attorneys' fees qualified as tax deductible expenses). In Moyer v. Commissioner,
the court allocated tax counsel fees between the taxpayer and his solely owned corporation. 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 304, 316 (1976). For an allocation of legal fees between exempt and non-exempt
classifications, see Andrews v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1339 (1992) (legal fees incurred
in attempt to obtain Social Security benefits deductible to the extent taxable) and Revenue Rul-
ing 87-102, 1987-2 C.B. 78.
150. Perhaps the most basic distinguishing factor among taxpayers is "family status". Both
the standard deduction, I.R.C. § 63(c) (1993), and the taxable income levels at which higher tax
rates "kick in," id. § l(a)-(d), are based on the taxpayer's marital status. Variations on income
also are used as a distinguishing factor in the Code. See, e.g., id. § 135 (allowing an exclusion
from income for Series EE savings bond interest used for qualifying educational expenses up to a
certain "adjusted gross income" level); id. § 86 (excluding from income Social Security receipts
below a "modified adjusted gross income" level); id. § 21 (phasing out the child care credit
based on adjusted gross income). Also, being an employee, as opposed to being self-employed,
can result in the loss of tax benefits. See id. § 62(a)(1) (denying "above-the-line" treatment for
most employee business expenses).
151. Section 6012 sets out the income tax filing requirements.
152. Congress' stated purpose in enacting section 67 was to simplify taxpayers' recordkeep-
ing requirements. "This floor will contribute to simplification by relieving individuals of the
burden of recordkeeping unless they expect to incur such expenditures in excess of the percentage
floor." SEN. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1987).
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for but a few. Primarily for this reason, the treatment of tax compli-
ance costs should be reconsidered.
B. Uneven Treatment of Compliance Costs
First, it is beneficial to take a closer look at tax compliance costs to
determine which, if not all, of these expenses merit tax treatment re-
consideration. Since section 212(3) applies to expenses incurred rela-
tive to all taxes, it is worthwhile to isolate those of particular interest.
Although section 67 may govern all section 212(3)-type expenses, Rev-
enue Ruling 92-29 carves out special treatment for only one, namely,
federal income tax compliance costs.'53 Of course, the federal income
tax is the only tax that touches all federal income tax filers. Federal
income tax compliance costs are the only tax-related expenses that by
their nature are common to all federal tax filers. Consequently, it
seems sensible to treat these costs uniformly. Expenses incurred rela-
tive to state, local, foreign, and other federal taxes should not be
items of immediate concern.
Limiting reform to federal income tax compliance costs is justifia-
ble. Although costs incurred incident to resolving controversies related
to other taxes may deserve deduction status, they are different from
federal income tax compliance costs. The latter costs are directly re-
lated to one's federal tax liability because they are incurred for no
reason other than to comply with the federal income tax itself. Com-
pliance costs for all other taxes, on the other hand, are only indirectly
related to one's federal income tax liability.
The case of deductible state income taxes is illustrative. The cost
related to establishing the state tax liability directly impacts one's state
tax liability. The state tax liability may impact one's federal tax liabil-
ity,154 but the compliance costs are incurred to directly affect the state
tax charge and not to obtain a reduced federal tax liability. The fact
that state income tax also is deductible for federal tax purposes proba-
bly plays very little, if any, part in the decision to incur costs incident
to state-tax filing. Indeed, compliance costs incurred to challenge
taxes other than the federal ipcome tax itself may result in a higher
federal tax liability. 55 There is at best only a tenuous causal relation-
153. Revenue Ruling 92-29 also expands section 62 treatment for other deductions that can
be directly tied into the section 62 activity. Thus, section 212(2) tax-related expenses would also
qualify for "above-the-line" treatment.
154. Section 164(a)(3) permits a deduction for state income taxes paid by individuals. Thus,
to the extent these are itemized deductions, the federal tax liability is affected.
155. To the extent one succeeds in challenging a state tax deficiency, there will be a lower
state tax deduction. The reduced deduction will result in a higher federal tax liability for taxpay-
ers who itemize deductions.
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ship between such compliance costs and one's federal income tax obli-
gation.
There also are other taxes which do not give rise to federal income
tax deductions. 5 6 Payments on some of them, like the federal estate 5 7
and gift taxes,'5" are specifically denied deductibility. 5 9 However,
compliance costs for contesting or determining these taxes are deducti-
ble.' ° Arguably, in these instances there may be no nexus between the
federal income tax and the tax compliance cost involved. Permitting
income tax deductions for these expenses requires greater explanation.
C. Compliance Costs Analyzed
Direct federal income tax compliance costs can be categorized into
three general groups: return preparation fees, audit-related costs, and
tax advice charges. Return preparation fees are expenses incurred for
the actual preparation of the individual's required federal tax return.
A return includes all accompanying schedules that must be executed
for a complete return, excluding attachments of copies from other tax
filings that serve only informational purposes on the individual's fed-
eral tax return.' 6' Thus, return preparation fees are those directly in-
curred for executing forms to satisfy one's filing requirement. The
definition contemplates reasonable costs incurred to properly com-
plete any schedule. It necessarily follows that the costs are limited to
completed transactions.' 62 Audit-related costs are those expenses rea-
sonably incurred to defend one's return against government inquiry or
challenge, including litigation expenses. Tax advice charges embrace
all other compliance costs, including tax planning and counseling fees,
and generally apply to structuring one's affairs to achieve certain fu-
ture tax consequences.
156. As a rule, an expense is deductible only if specifically allowed by the Code. Thus, in
general, only those taxes identified in subsections 164(a)(l)-(5) arc deductible by individuals.
However, subsection 164(a) allows certain taxes not listed in subsections 164(a)(l)-(5) to be de-
ductible if they can qualify as a deduction under either subsection 162(a) or section 212.
157. I.R.C. § 2001 (1993).
158. Id. §2501.
159. Id. § 275(a)(3).
160. Section 212(3) does not limit itself to deductible taxes, but includes expenses relating to
"any" tax.
161. Thus, if a taxpayer were required to include a Schedule K-I from a partnership or trust
to verify an item on I.R.S. Form 1040 or a schedule thereto, the cost of preparing the K-I or the
underlying partnership or trust return would not be a tax preparation expense.
162. Tax preparation fees are intended to include only those costs incurred as are necessary
to prepare the return. Generally, only closed transactions (completed events) are recognized for
tax purposes. 12A MERTEts LAW OF FEDERAL INcom TAX § 195 (1993). Fees for advice for
future tax years are not tax preparation expenses.
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Of these three categories, the tax advice grouping is clearly distin-
guishable from the other two. Whereas planning one's affairs to mini-
mize tax exposure is a legitimate activity, 63 it is a purely voluntary
one. One is legally obligated to meet the statutory filing require-
ments,1' but not to arrange finances to achieve a certain tax goal.
Because of their special nature, preparation fees and audit-related
charges should be targeted for tax treatment different from that of all
other section 212(3) items. 65 Revenue Ruling 92-29 has partially pro-
vided special recognition for these "target expenses," but has done so
unevenly (only for selected taxpayers). The system needs to ensure
that all taxpayers are treated equally on this point, especially since
some of these costs are directed at the heart of revenue collection-
voluntary compliance.
Preparation fees and audit-related expenses merit special tax treat-
ment. Tax preparation assistance is no longer a luxury for the well-to-
do or the lazy. As already noted, tax compliance is becoming iricreas-
ingly difficult. The Government is requiring that more forms be filed,
and the forms are becoming more detailed.'6 Entries on some forms
can be made only after other forms are completed and other computa-
tions are performed, 167 and even those schedules that are self-con-
tained units are not always easy to prepare. 16 In order to fill out the
163. In Chamberlain v. United States, the court stated that "a taxpayer has the legal right to
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means
which the law permits." 207 F.2d 462, 468 (1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954).
164. Section 665 1(a)(1) imposes a penalty on taxpayers who fail to file returns on time. See
William Kenny & Larry Jaffe, Reasonable Cause Can Be a Penalty Defense-But What Is It? 20
TAx'N LAW. 350 (1992); Malcolm L. Morris, Reliance on Counsel as Reasonable Cause: To the
Back Burner After Boyle? 31 Vn.L. L. REv. 525 (1986); Lorraine D. Chatman, Walden v. Com-
missioner: What Relief is Available to Taxpayers Whose Tax Return is Lost By the United States
Postal Service? 42 TAx LAW. 735 (1989); 14 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAX § 55.68
(1993).
165. Arguably, some audit-related charges also are voluntary in that a taxpayer can accept
the Government's recommended change(s) to a return without doing more than signing a form
and remitting the deficiency. The decision to challenge the Government's position therefore can
be said to be "voluntary". However, to adopt such a position truly stretches the common under-
standing of "voluntary". Reasonable people would not merely accede to a tax adjustment unless
they believed the charge was proper. The Code operates under the rubric that taxpayers deal with
each other at arm's length. It seems sensible to conclude that the Government would expect
taxpayers to deal with it at arm's length as well. Thus, audit-related expenses, although not
required by law, are nonetheless involuntarily incurred.
166. See, e.g., I.R.S. Form EIC for the Earned Income Credit, Section 32 (requiring one to
follow an elaborate flowchart just to determine its use).
167. The basic Schedule A for itemized deductions is illustrative. Entries for the medical
expense deduction, the charitable deduction casualty losses, and miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions cannot be finalized until adjusted gross income is computed from I.R.S. Form 1040.
168. For example, see I.R.S. Form 3903, which is used for computing the moving expense
deduction permitted by Section 217, as well as I.R.S. Form 8892, used for determining allowable
passive activity losses permitted by Section 469.
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tax schedules, taxpayers not only have to comprehend the instruc-
tions, but they must also understand the relevant law. The Govern-
ment estimates that it takes more than 3 1/2 hours for a taxpayer
merely to execute the basic Form 1040,169 and that more than 2 1/2
hours are needed to "learn about the law or the form itself."170 Fur-
thermore, this does not include the estimated 49 minutes needed to
copy, assemble, and send the form.17' If additional schedules are re-
quired, that only adds to the time needed to execute the return and
acquire the expertise to do so. 172 By its own admission, the Govern-
ment recognizes that meeting one's tax-filing obligation can be diffi-
cult and attributes the difficulty to the complexity of the Code. 173
Indeed, the complexity is such that taxpayers seeking information
from the I.R.S. have been receiving a disquietingly high percentage of
incorrect responses.' 74 Clearly, the extensive use of return preparers is
not merely a product of math-averse taxpayers. 7 5
It is ironic, if not downright foolish, that a tax system dependent
upon voluntary compliance has erected considerable barriers to satis-
fying one's tax obligation. Substantial compliance with tax laws, the
Government's operating goal,1 76 is becoming harder for taxpayers to
achieve. It is probably the federal fisc that suffers from this complex-
ity, as it is likely that taxpayers' errors will more often than not be
made in their own, rather than the Government's, favor.
Rather than battle the forms themselves, many taxpayers retain pro-
fessional tax preparers. The Government should encourage this course
of action; paid preparers are subject to a higher standard of care than
169. 1992 I.R.S. Form 1040, p. 4 .
170. Id. This statistic probably comes as a great surprise to many a law student who has
struggled through an introductory tax course.
171. Id.
172. Id. The Government provides the following time estimates for "learning the law,"
"preparation" and "assembly": Schedule B (reporting dividend and interest income), 10 min-
utes, 17 minutes, and 20 minutes, respectively; Schedule D (reporting capital asset transactions),
55 minutes, 1 hour 8 minutes, and 42 minutes, respectively; and Schedule C (reporting self em-
ployment income), 1 hour 5 minutes, 1 hour 57 minutes, and 25 minutes, respectively.
173. 1992 I.R.S. Form 1040, p. 4. In a recent statement, the Internal Revenue Service said
that almost one half of filers enlist professional help. IR-93-19, Feb. 18, 1993.
174. The Internal Revenue Service's Director of Taxpayer Services stated that "30.8%0 of the
answers on the toll free system would lead taxpayers to a wrong result." STANDAED FED. TAx
REP. 5 (March 15, 1989). Also, I.R.S. publications are routinely amended to correct errors. For
example, see Announcement 93-48, 1993-12 I.R.B. 21, correcting an error in an example in Pub-
lication 917 (1992).
175. In 1989, a total of 112,136,000 individual income tax returns (I.R.S. Forms 1040, 1040-
EZ, and 1040A) were filed with the I.R.S. Of those filed, 48,177,000, or 49%, were signed by a
preparer. In 1990, 113,717,000 individual income tax returns were filed, of which 49,680,000, or
44%, were signed by preparers. 12 STAT. OF INcoM BULL. 124 (1992).
176. See Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
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individual taxpayers, 77 and thus are likely to file more complete and
accurate returns. 178 Increased accuracy means better compliance and
possibly greater revenue collection. 7 9
Can there be any expense more tax-related than audit-related
charges? Challenges to taxpayers' positions in a voluntary compliance
system are a necessary by-product of human nature- even the best
fielders make errors. The more pressing concern arises when taxpayers
are called upon to justify positions taken, rather than merely to verify
numerical amounts reported. Tax law is a creature of federal statute,
interpreted by extensive regulations and case law, augmented by volu-
minous administrative rulings, and sometimes impacted by relevant
local law. By defending a legal position in court, taxpayers, win or
lose, help define the law. This body of law provides guidance for bet-
ter compliance by other filers, thereby enhancing revenue collection
and reducing costs. It is again ironic that Congress has decided to re-
imburse taxpayers for attorneys' fees when they are forced to defend
frivolous actions,8 0 but will not encourage taxpayers to obtain assis-
tance which could eliminate the waste of time and effort incident to
complying with an audit.
Return preparation expenses and audit-related expenses are distinct
from other charges under the tax compliance cost umbrella in that
they directly relate to actions required by law. Unlike tax advice
177. Section 6694 imposes penalties on paid preparers for certain actions that result in an
understatement of tax owed. Section 6695 imposes additional duties on paid preparers. Paid
preparers also are subject to liability for failing to inquire into information provided by a tax-
payer. See Brockhouse v. United States, 749 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Marcello v.
Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968)). See gener-
ally IRA L. Ss4'nMOFF, LIAnrry oF TAX RETURN PREPARERS (1989).
178. See Frederic G. Comeel, Ethical Guidance for Tax Practice, 28 TAX L. REv. 1 (1972).
179. One of the major drawbacks of a voluntary compliance system is unreported income.
Presumably, paid preparers with knowledge of facts provided by taxpayers will educate clients
on the necessity of including receipts in income. This might result in better compliance and en-
hanced revenue receipts.
180. Section 7430 allows prevailing taxpayers to recover attorneys' fees for frivolous posi-
tions taken by the I.R.S. Enacted in 1982, Congress believed that the measure would "deter
abusive actions or overreaching by the [I.R.S] and . . . enable individual taxpayers to vindicate
their rights regardless of their economic circumstances." Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 445 (Comm. Print 1982).
The measure also was designed to reduce forum shopping. Prior to its enactment, attorneys'
fees were recoverable only in tax cases brought in a district court or in the Court of Claims. The
new rule allows recoveries for suits brought in the Tax Court as well. I.RC. § 7430(c)(6).
Section 7430 has been used in a wide variety of contexts. See, e.g., Pate v. United States, 982
F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1993) (taxpayer recovered reasonable litigation costs incurred as a result of
I.R.S. action brought without substantial justification); Hanson v. Commissioner, 975 F.2d 1150
(5th Cir. 1992) (attorneys' fees awarded where I.R.S.'s position that statute of limitations on
assessing deficiency for a return had not expired was without substantial justification).
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charges, they are incurred to satisfy or perfect a legally imposed re-
quirement. Their involuntary nature suggests that they merit some fa-
vorable treatment. How that can best be accomplished is not an easy
question to answer, but is one worthy of an attempt.
D. Suggested Solutions
Congress has determined that tax compliance costs merit special tax
treatment. Unfortunately, it has failed to respect the disparate natures
of the myriad costs involved. Administrative rule now has given pref-
erence to certain costs, but based upon something other than the char-
acter of the expense. The preference provided by Revenue Ruling 92-
29 has returned treatment of compliance cost deductions to a pre-Hig-
gins era; given the limitations imposed by section 67, tax compliance
costs will be deductible principally by taxpayers who can tie the
charges to their trades, businesses, or rent or royalty activities. Others
who will be permitted to avail themselves of the deduction will be able
to do so primarily because of the relative size of their miscellaneous
itemized deductions as compared to their adjusted gross incomes.
Some curative action should be taken.
Retraction of Revenue Ruling 92-29 would end some unfairness,
but that would still leave the target expenses-tax preparation costs
and audit-related costs-lacking tax-favored status. The better ap-
proach is to devise a means by which these expenses are treated identi-
cally for all taxpayers who incur them. A number of options are
available.
One way to ameliorate the current disparity is to reclassify all sec-
tion 212(3) items as nonmiscellaneous itemized deductions. This
would eliminate the extra accounting required by section 67; as long
as the taxpayer itemized deductions, tax compliance costs would be
fully deductible. Of course, non-itemizing taxpayers would not receive
any benefit, but that is presently the case anyway. This result is tolera-
ble on the theory that the size of the standard deduction more than
compensates taxpayers for deductible expenses foregone by the deci-
sion not to itemize.'8 ' This does not, however, provide the equality
sought. The target expenses may merit a universal deduction, even for
non-itemizers. Thus, the reclassification option, while easy and per-
haps not overly costly, leaves much to be desired.
A simple way to overcome the shortcomings of the preceding option
is to reposition the deduction for target expenses in the tax calculus.
181. See S. REP. No. 66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 15, 47-53 (1977), reprinted in 1977-1 C.B.
469, 470, 473, and 477-81; H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 32 (1978), reprinted in
1978-3 vol. 1 C.B. 181,203,206.
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Amending section 62(a) of the Code, the section that defines adjusted
gross income, to include the target expenses in the deductions used to
compute adjusted gross income would make the deductions available
to itemizers and non-itemizers alike. By including only the target ex-
penses, the current tax structure would remain relatively unaltered.
All tax preparation costs would be put on an even par with those cur-
rently favored by Revenue Ruling 92-29, and the remaining compli-
ance costs would retain their classification as miscellaneous itemized
deductions.
One disadvantage common to both "deduction" solutions is that
the benefit conferred would be a function of the taxpayer's marginal
tax rate."2 Consequently, the deduction approach has a regressive
taint. '83 Not only would taxpayers in lower brackets receive a smaller
benefit, but some taxpayers might actually receive no benefit at all.'1
Opting for a tax credit can provide greater fairness because a credit
provides a direct dollar-for-dollar offset against the tax liability. 85
The benefit could be linked to the actual expense, independent of
marginal tax rates.
A major disadvantage to using a tax credit is its cost. A full tax
credit for targeted expenses would sharply curtail, if not eliminate,
any incentive for taxpayers to negotiate a fair fee with their tax pre-
parers. To prevent abuses and protect revenues, any credit proposal
would need to include a cap.186
Another way to minimize costs is to compute the credit as a per-
centage of the cost incurred. The percentage allowable can be set up
on a sliding scale, allowing a higher percentage as a credit to lower
182. "Marginal tax rate" is the actual tax rate at which each additional dollar of income
would be taxed. WasT's TAX LAw DIcfloNARY 327 (1992).
183. Taxpayers in a higher tax bracket receive a larger benefit because their higher marginal
tax rate is applied to the deduction amount. Consequently, lower income taxpayers effectively
pay more in the sense that their lower marginal rates provide less of a benefit. This has been
dubbed "upside-down equity". See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives As A Device For Imple-
menting Government Policy: A Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv.
L. REv. 705 (1970); Bonnyman v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 625, 629 (E.D. Tenn. 1957) (criti-
cizing the approach), aff'd, 261 F.2d 835 (6th Cir. 1958).
184. Taxpayers who do not itemize deductions or whose aggregate miscellaneous itemized
deductions do not exceed two percent of adjusted gross income will not receive the benefit of the
otherwise deductible expenses. I.R.C. § 67(a) (1993).
185. For a discussion of the "credit versus deduction" option, see Murray L. Weidenbaum,
Personal Income Tax Credits, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 516 (1974) (favoring a credit over deduc-
tions) and Gerard M. Brannon & Elliot R. Morss, The Tax Allowance For Dependents: Deduc-
tions Versus Credits, 26 NAT', TAX J. 599, 602-06 (1973) (arguing that a deduction is more
equitable than a credit).
186. A "cap" limits the amount of credit permitted. Caps are currently used throughout the
Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 21(c) (1993) (the child care credit); id. § 121 (limiting the amount of
gain arising from the sale of one's principal residence).
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income taxpayers, and it also can be matched with a cap or benefit
phase-out. 8 7 Caps and phase-outs, however, can defeat the fairness of
using a credit. Thus, the credit approach must be tailored to its objec-
tive.
These suggestions represent improvements over the current manner
in which the target expenses are treated. Each has its advantages and
disadvantages; choosing any one over the others or opting for the
status quo may be but a reflection of one's personal tax policy view-
point. Change that carries a potentially heavy financial cost must be
measured against the policy goals of the tax system. After making
such an analysis, the reasons for choosing the section 62 approach
should become clear.
E. Pursuing Policy
Unfortunately, conventional tax policy debate probably cannot of-
fer much support for the position that target expenses deserve
"above-the-line" deduction treatment. First, most tax policy discus-
sion revolves around national fiscal policy issues. The focus usually is
on whether an income tax, a direct consumption tax, some other tax,
or any combination thereof, is preferable, while little attention is
given to the specific provisions within the system chosen. Second,
once a specific system or approach is chosen, the bulk of the policy
concerns involve broad-based matters, such as whether to employ a
uniform or a graduated rate schedule. Tax type and tax structure is-
sues have wide-ranging fiscal implications. The decisions reached with
respect to them reflect the major goals of the tax system. These objec-
tives, or macro-criteria, 18 are pivotal concerns that have shaped the
Code.
Despite the guidance that macro-criteria might provide, the Code's
cloth is not woven from a single policy theme. Rather, it is a patch-
work put together over time. This is not surprising since the Code is,
187. See, e.g., id. § 21(a)(2) (phasing out the child care credit); id. § 219(g) (phasing out the
IRA deduction based on certain taxpayers' adjusted gross incomes).
188. Seven macro-criteria are identified in Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income
Tax Policy, 17 STA. L. REv. 567, 568 (1965). They are: adequacy (to supply "adequate" reve-
nue); practicality (to achieve a "practical" and workable income tax system); equity (to impose
"equal" taxes upon those who enjoy equal incomes); stability (to assist in achieving economic
"stability"); reduced economic inequality (to "reduce economic inequality"); free market com-
patibility (to avoid impairment of the operation of the "market-oriented economy"); and politi-
cal order (to accomplish a high degree of harmony between the income tax and the quest for
"political order"). See generally id. at 569-97. Professor Sneed states that these macro-criteria
have served as the guidelines that shaped our income tax system. Id. at 568. He further suggests
that other forces of a more political and mono-dimensional nature also have impacted the fed-
eral tax legislation. Id. at 597-99.
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after all, a product of the political process. However, there may be
other reasons for its uneven design. One reason is that the Code has
been used to achieve a variety of small-scale goals unrelated to the
macro-criteria. Another is that, rightly or wrongly, the Code is used
to cure nonfiscal national ills. Consequently, some provisions have
purposes other than to raise revenue. The argument has been made
that by giving preferred tax status to an activity, the Government is in
fact subsidizing that activity.8 9 The so-called "tax expenditure the-
ory" has gained sufficient currency that all proposed Code changes
now are accompanied by cost projections. 110 Given that the present tax
system is firmly in place, most current income tax policy concerns do
not involve macro-criteria, although large-scale policy issues do occa-
sionally arise.'9' More often, however, change is directed toward
achieving singular goals. Thus, the Code is more likely to be subjected
to mere tinkering rather than major overhaul, and tax policy tends to
reveal itself on a provision-by-provision basis.
Ideally, there would be a set formula that Congress could turn to,
when considering Code changes, to determine if the proposal would
make both sides balance. Unfortunately, no such formula exists, and
proposed tax changes must be justified on their own merits. Regretta-
bly, macro-criteria tend to operate primarily on a large scale and are
not always useful when considering Code sections individually. Politi-
cal concerns aside, decisions regarding separate Code sections should
have some rational basis, utilizing normative criteria. Cost and fair-
ness are the two criteria that should be used in debating the case for a
189. This position was criticized by Surrey, supra note 185. For a recent analysis of the
position, see Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1159.
190. An Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (1982), requires mention of tax expenditures in the
President's annual budget. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 299 (1976), defines "tax expenditures" as "revenue losses attribut-
able to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduc-
tion from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax or a deferral
of tax liability."
191. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note I, presented the first truly major restructuring
of the federal income tax since the Code was rearranged in 1954. The Act substituted a modified
flat tax system-a two-tiered rate structure-for the then-existing multi-graduated rate structure.
To maintain revenue neutrality, The Tax Reform Act of 1986 broadened the tax base by decreas-
ing the number of exclusions from income. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 67, 74 (1993) (the later section
restricting and eliminating deductions regarding prizes and awards); supra notes 112-123 and
accompanying text; and the introduction of the passive activity loss rules, I.R.C. § 469 (1993).
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), completely revamped
the federal estate and gift taxes that had been in place for over four decades. Currently there is
discussion about adding an extra tax rate to the federal income tax and implementing a new
energy tax. See Summary of the Administration's Revenue Proposals, STANDARD FED. TAX REP.
1, 32-43, 64-66 (Feb. 25, 1993).
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tax compliance cost deduction.' 92 The proposal set out below ad-
dresses concerns raised earlier over the deductibility of target expenses
and is followed by an analysis addressing the controlling criteria.
Target expenses can be made available to all taxpayers as above-the-
line deductions. This would require amending section 62 to identify
the proposed deduction as one used in computing adjusted gross in-
come and to define the expenses that would qualify for the special
treatment. Consider the following proposal:
Sec. 62(a) General Rule - For the purposes of this subtitle, the term
"adjusted gross income" means, in the case of an individual, gross
income minus the following deductions:
(15)(proposed) Qualified Tax Cost Expenses - The deduction
allowed by section 212(3) for "qualified tax cost expenses."
(d)(1) (proposed) "Qualified tax cost expenses" are those expenses
allowable under section 212(3) relating to a return required to be
filed pursuant to section 6012 or 6013
(a) necessary for the preparation of the return; or
(b) incurred exclusively to respond to any inquiry or chal-
lenge by the Secretary or his delegate with respect to the re-
turn.
(d)(2) Amount Allowable - The maximum amount of qualified tax
cost expenses in any given year shall not exceed $500, no more than
half of which can be attributable to subsection (d)(1)(a) items.
(d)(3) Tax advice, planning or similar fees are not "qualified tax cost
expenses."
The proposal approaches the problem simply. An "above-the-line"
deduction is given for qualified tax cost expenses ("QTC" expenses),
a statutory term for target expenses. QTC expenses are defined in a
separate subsection of the proposal. A cap is included as a cost con-
tainment measure.
Proposed section 62(a)(15) permits "above-the-line" treatment only
for expenses that are allowable under section 212(3). This is in keeping
with the function of section 62, which is not to grant deductions, but
to identify deductions permitted elsewhere in the Code to compute ad-
justed gross income. Thus, the proposal does not add a new deduction
to the Code; it merely repositions in the tax calculus a currently per-
192. In this context, "cost" refers to the lost revenue that would result from implementing
the change.
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missible deduction. This is consistent with the equity criterion, i.e.,
creating equal access to the already existing deduction. Further, under
section 62, a deduction can only be used once. 93 Therefore, an item
used "above the line" cannot be taken again elsewhere on one's re-
turn.
The centerpiece of the proposal is the definition of QTC expenses.
Proposed sections 62(d)(1)(a) and (b) provide that tax preparation and
audit-related fees qualify for "above-the-line" treatment. The refer-
ence to sections 6012 and 6013 makes clear that QTC expenses are
limited to federal income tax-related charges. The wording of pro-
posed subsection (d)(1)(a) is broad enough to include charges beyond
those for the actual physical execution of the return. Thus, costs for
appraisals, computer tax programs, and tax guidance from the
government 194 could all be QTC expenses. The "necessary" language
of the subsection should cover all bona fide tax preparation costs and
prevent more remote expenditures from gaining favored status.
Proposed subsection (d)(1)(b) classifies audit-related costs as QTC
expenses. The word "exclusively" ensures that only those costs neces-
sitated by an audit receive special tax treatment. Proposed subsection
(d)(3) specifically states that tax advice, tax planning, or similar
charges are not QTC expenses. The case of expenses incurred for re-
quests for government rulings on tax questions illustrates how pro-
posed subsections (d)(1)(a) and (d)(3) work together. A "closed
transaction" test, similar to the approach taken in Kaufmann, is used
to determine whether a cost is a QTC expense. If the ruling relates to
a matter for a return due in the year of the request or a prior year, the
charges would be QTC preparation charges. Charges for rulings ad-
dressing prospective transactions would fall under proposed subsec-
tion (d)(3) and would not be considered QTC expenses. Rulings
addressing both open and closed transactions would require an alloca-
tion of the fee to QTC and non-QTC activity, as was done in Kauf-
mann. 9 The subsection reinforces the position that QTC expenses are
limited to those charges reasonably incurred solely due to the federal
tax filing obligation. Charges to reduce one's tax liability may merit
deductibility, but there is no reason to elevate them to QTC status.
The proposal includes a cap, but presents it with a unique twist.
Proposed subsection (d)(2) sets an allowable amount of $500 for QTC
expenses. Expenses over the limit, even though they may fall within
193. I.R.C. § 62(a) (1993).
194. Revenue Ruling 89-68, 1989-1 C.B. 82, holds that attorneys' fees and filing costs in-
curred for obtaining private letter rulings are deductible under Section 212(3).
195. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
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the QTC definition, may not receive "above-the-line" treatment.
These expenses, however, are still deductible under section 212(3).
QTC expenses in excess of $500 can be aggregated with other miscella-
neous itemized deductions to determine their tax fate. In its current
form, the proposal imposes a static cap, but a provision adjusting the
cap for inflation could be added.
The cap pays homage to the cost criterion. Notice that the proposal
actually limits tax return preparation QTC's to $250. Should the re-
turn preparation charge be $290, only $250 would receive QTC treat-
ment, even though the taxpayer incurred no other "proposed
subsection (d)(1)" costs. The excess $40 becomes a miscellaneous
itemized deduction. However, should a taxpayer incur a $300 audit-
related charge (a proposed subsection (d)(l)(b) expense), the full
amount could be applied toward the $500 limit. The purpose behind
the bifurcated cap is to maintain some parity among taxpayers and to
minimize the negative impact of the "upside-down equity" that comes
with a deduction. The "(d)(1)(a)" limit also reduces the risk that tax
preparation fees will be overstated. Given their inherent nature, audit-
related expenses should not be so limited. Taxpayers who do not need
help executing a return nonetheless may feel outmatched by the Gov-
ernment in an audit.'" Such taxpayers, not having sought a deduction
to offset the cost of meeting their tax obligations, ought to get the full
benefit of the cap to defend their actions.
The cap also is necessitated by fiscal restraints. An overly expensive
proposal might so impair revenue-raising objectives that it would need
a compelling alternative justification. It is doubtful that an equity
argument can be fashioned to show that the QTC proposal is justified
at any cost.
When considering cost, one should recognize that it cannot be com-
puted in the abstract. Cost should be measured against what is being
bought. The maximum cost of the proposal may appear to be $500
(the maximum QTC amount allowable), multiplied by the mean mar-
ginal tax rate of all returns filed. Actually, however, Revenue Ruling
92-29 already permits for some taxpayers what the proposal allows for
all. Furthermore, expenses that would qualify as QTC's include sec-
tion 212(3) expenses that are presently deductible, even if they do not
meet the Revenue Ruling 92-29 tests. Although sections 67 and 68 may
eliminate, or at least reduce, otherwise allowable section 212(3) deduc-
tions, some of those deductions still are being taken. Furthermore,
196. In Bonnyman, Judge Taylor observed, "Only an attorney admitted to practice before
the Tax Court and skilled in that practice could reasonably be expected to know how to conduct
a tax contest." 156 F. Supp. at 629.
DEDUCTIBILITY
since so few of the total returns filed are actually audited, there will
not be a significant number of proposed subsection (d)(1)(b) deduc-
tions claimed. Finally, if the proposal improves compliance, there
should be increased revenue or perhaps more efficient collection pro-
cedures.' 97 Thus, the true cost of the proposal would be substantially
lower than the maximum calculable amount.
Of the proposals identified, making QTC expenses "above-the-
line" deductions best addresses the problem. Merely recharacterizing
target expenses as nonmiscellaneous itemized deductions does not sat-
isfy the requirements of equity. Adopting a credit may be more equi-
table than creating a deduction, 98 but it is not cost-effective. Though
all taxpayers benefit equally from a credit, an unlimited credit would
be too costly. The dollar limit on any cap would have to be so low
that it is uncertain whether the cap could encourage taxpayers to seek
qualified assistance. Another perceived evil of the credit is that its ex-
istence will help set a minimum for tax preparation, regardless of the
amount of work required for the task at hand.199 Thus, the credit does
not seem to be the right choice for the type of item involved.
The preferred option is to make target expenses section 62 items. By
doing so, the benefit becomes universally available. Cost is somewhat
controlled by each taxpayer's marginal rate, and is minimized by the
cap. Expenses that exceed the cap would be accorded the same treat-
ment they presently receive.
The proposal advanced here is not faultless. Notably, as a deduc-
tion, it still favors high income taxpayers. Nevertheless, it may be
preferable to the credit approach for psychological reasons: there is
something more appealing about a $500 deduction, as compared to a
$45 credit, even though in certain circumstances the two have the
same tax effect." Though higher income taxpayers potentially will
reap a greater benefit, the cap should prevent abuse and protect reve-
nue. The deduction approach recognizes the likelihood that higher in-
197. The QTC proposal should provide a dual benefit. The enhanced compliance precipi-
tated by professional preparers under a strict standard of care should reduce omissions and mis-
statements of income and improperly claimed deductions. The use of professional preparers
should also result in greater accuracy in returns generally, which should make audits quicker and
easier. A reduction in the amount of time and effort spent per audit will enable the I.R.S. to
review more returns, thus encouraging still better compliance.
198. See Brannon & Morss, supra note 187.
199. A simple return, such as a 1040A, may actually require only a half hour of work and a
$30 fee. If the credit was set at $50, it is more than likely the tax preparer would charge $50. The
taxpayer would not have an economic reason to complain or resist payment of the extra $20 as it
reduces his or her tax liability and does not come "out of pocket".
200. A $500 deduction for a taxpayer in a 1506 marginal tax bracket creates a $45 tax savings
($500 x.15 = $45.00).
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come taxpayers have both a greater need for return preparers and a
larger relative cost per return. Further, higher income returns are
more apt to be audited, 20' and thus higher income taxpayers are more
likely to incur proposed subsection (d)(2)-type charges. There is no
ideal solution to the problem, but the proposal represents an improve-
ment over the status quo.
In sum, a tax system dependent upon voluntary compliance requires
accurate reporting and proper interpretation of the law. Currently,
there is substantial underreporting of income. Penalties improve com-
pliance somewhat, 202 but they are not a panacea; the Government
should make other efforts to encourage accurate filing. Subsidizing
the proper execution of returns is one such response. Another is assist-
ing citizens in defending their good faith actions in meeting the feder-
ally imposed obligation.
The new section 62 proposal best meets the policy criteria for evalu-
ating the needed reform. The proposal satisfies the equity criterion by
creating equal access to the deduction for target expenses, those ex-
penses necessarily incurred in meeting one's federal tax obligation.
Limiting language prevents abuse by excluding tax planning and ad-
vice. Further, the cap contains costs, while still allowing excess target
expenses to be taken as miscellaneous itemized deductions under sec-
tion 212(3). Finally, by encouraging the use of professional return pre-
parers, the proposal offsets some of its own cost by the amount of
savings realized through enhanced compliance and return accuracy.
The QTC proposal is worth considering.
IV. CONCLUSION
Clearly, meeting one's federal income tax obligation has become
more difficult as the governing rules have increased in number and
complexity. Taxpayers are frustrated by the difficulty of the filing re-
quirements. This can easily lead to inaccurate returns and lost reve-
nue. Many taxpayers have given up the battle and resorted to
obtaining professional tax assistance. Recent legislation effectively,
eliminated the tax deduction that for many years had been available
for such tax compliance costs. Now, through administrative rule,
some taxpayers have been regranted this tax relief to the exclusion of
others, even though the costs incurred are common to all.
201. The I.R.S. routinely reports that taxpayers with incomes in excess of $50,000 arc at
greater risk of being audited than taxpayers with lower adjusted gross incomes. See ROBERT S.
FINK, TAx FRAUD § 1.02[4] (1986).
202. See supra note 166.
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Allowing deductions for some but not others is inequitable. A
section 62 deduction for federal income tax preparation expenses and
audit-related expenses should be made available to all taxpayers. Since
every taxpayer must comply with the statutorily imposed filing re-
quirements, every taxpayer should be afforded the same deduction op-
portunities with respect to meeting that obligation. A country founded
on the idea of "No taxation without representation" may see as its
new rallying cry: "No taxation without deductible representation." In
sum, costs incurred for determining deductions deserve deductibility.

